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"Bad laws are the worst sort of tyranny."
-Edmund Burke
INTRODUCTION
On October 26, 2001, President Bush signed into law the USA
Patriot Act' ("Act"), which was drafted as a consequence of the
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon only six
weeks earlier.2 The Act is divided into ten sections with perhaps
the most noteworthy provisions being Title II, "Enhanced
Surveillance Procedures"; Title III, "International Money
Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001";
Title IV, "Protecting the Border"-dealing with immigration
issues; and Title VIII, "Strengthening the Criminal Laws Against
Terrorism".3 This Note focuses on the Act's Title III anti-money
J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, May 2003. My thanks to
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1. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
2. See Matthew Purdy, A Nation Challenged: The Law; Bush's New Rules to
Fight Terror Transform the Legal Landscape, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 25, 2001, at 1A;
78 Interpreter Releases 1703 (Nov. 5, 2001) (giving a broad overview of the Act).
3. See generally USA Patriot Act. The other titles of the Act are Title I,
"Enhancing Domestic Security Against Terrorism"; Title V, "Removing
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laundering provisions, its impact on financial institutions, and its
potential for thwarting organized crime and future terrorist
activity.
The Act was rammed through Congress with "only one public
hearing and little debate,"4 and was one of the "swiftest-moving
bills in federal history."5 It was approved 356-66 by the House of
Representatives and 98-1 by the Senate.6  Some of the more
important provisions of the Act are as follows:
Expanded federal ability to conduct electronic
surveillance and nationwide search warrants. That
includes roving wiretaps that allow tapping
conversations of an individual no matter what phone he
or she uses. And it includes wide latitude to screen
computers, including e-mail messages and e-mail
address books.
" FBI access to private records "to protect against
international terrorism."
* Detention for as long as a week of immigrants
suspected of terrorism or of supporting terrorism
without their being legally charged with a crime or
immigration violations. The new law also permits
deportation of foreigners who raise money for terrorist
groups.
" A requirement that banks find the sources of money in
some large private accounts and that foreign banks
detail suspect transactions.
Obstacles to Investigating Terrorism"; Title VI, "Providing for Victims of
Terrorism, Public Safety Officers, and their Families"; Title VII, "Increased
Information Sharing for Critical Infrastructure Protection"; Title IX, "Improved
Intelligence"; and Title X, "Miscellaneous". Id.
4. See Infringing on Civil Liberties, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 29, 2001,
at 10A.
5. J.M. Lawrence, War on Terrorism; Anti-Terror Laws in Place; Feds
Urgently Implement Crackdown, BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 27, 2001, News, at 5.
6. See id.
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In an effort to appease civil libertarians, the law has a
sunset provision-its major provisions expire in 2004
unless extended-and a provision that the Justice
Department prepare reports on how it is affecting civil
liberties.7
Despite the overwhelming support the Act received from
Congress, it has already come under harsh criticism by liberals and
conservatives alike for unleashing unprecedented powers on
government authorities that in some cases have been challenged as
unconstitutional.8 The balance between national security and civil
liberties has been debated for years, and it seems to have resumed
prominence in the conscience of many constitutional scholars.9 To
date, the Act has primarily been analyzed and challenged on
7. Ann McFeatters, Bush Signs Anti-Terror Bill; Says Tough Law Will
Preserve Constitutional Rights, PITTSBURGH-POST GAZETTE, Oct. 27, 2001, at A6.
8. See generally George Lardner, Jr., On Left and Right, Concern over Anti-
Terrorism Moves; Administration Actions Threaten Civil Liberties, Critics Say,
WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2001, at A40 (discussing various criticisms of the Act with
respect to its encroachment on civil liberties, such as "the order empowering
[Attorney General] Ashcroft to violate the attorney-client privilege without a
court order" and citing Sen. Patrick Leahy's observation that "[tlhere's a lot of
disquiet among both Republican and Democratic senators who think the rules of
law are being turned on their head, and they wonder what we gain by it."); Ross
K. Baker, Nobody Named Bush King Yet, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2001, at Bl
("The U.S. Constitution proclaims that 'the executive power shall be vested in a
president of the United States.' It does not say that exclusive power shall be
vested in the president. Yet that seems to be the interpretation placed on its
responses to terrorism in recent weeks by the Bush administration.").
9. See, e.g., Mark G. Young, What Big Eyes and Ears You Have!: A New
Regime for Covert Government Surveillance, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1046-
1109 (2001) (analyzing the Act's electronic surveillance provisions within the
context of the Fourth Amendment, and concluding, in part, that "as Fourth
Amendment doctrine has evolved the government/law enforcement component
has grown steadily more robust and expansive, while the rights component has
remained static or has weakened."); Marion Davis, Immigrants Urged to Be Alert
to Loss of Liberties, PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 11, 2002, at B1 (discussing
constitutional challenges to the Act's immigration provisions and comparing the
U.S. response to prior periods in U.S. history in which immigration policies were
revised).
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constitutional grounds for its electronic surveillance provisions...
and its rules with respect to immigrants."
Perhaps due to the outcry over the civil liberties ramifications
of Titles II and IV, the Act's Title III overhaul of U.S. money
laundering legislation appears to have been somewhat overlooked.
Title III is known formally as the International Money Laundering
Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001 ("IMLA
Act").Y '2 It will have a significant impact on the way financial
institutions do business, and it will similarly affect many businesses
not traditionally regarded as "financial institutions."'3 Banks have
long been involved with the federal government in the fight against
money laundering through such measures as the filing of currency
transaction reports ("CTRs") and suspicious activity reports
("SARs").'4 The IMLA Act not only expands the duties of banks
10. See Young, supra note 9, at 1046-1109. To locate the electronic
surveillance provisions, see The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot
Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 201-225, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
11. See Davis, supra note 9, at B1. To locate the immigration provisions, see
USA Patriot Act §§ 401-428.
12. USA Patriot Act §§ 301-377.
13. See, e.g., Katherine Goncharoff, New Laundering Rules Draw VCs'
Interest, DAILY DEAL, Mar. 19, 2002, available at 2002 WL 6788514 (providing an
overview of the Act's impact on financial institutions, particularly venture capital
firms, and stating that "financial institutions that previously didn't have to worry
much about money laundering will be required to comply with the new laws,
among them securities broker dealers, money transfer businesses, credit unions,
issuers of travelers' checks and some credit-card system operators.").
14. The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 114 (1970)
(codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5314, 5316-5324) requires banks to
file currency transaction reports for all cash deposits and withdrawals in excess of
$10,000. See Geoffrey M. Connor, Banking Aspects of the USA PATRIOT Act,
N.J. L.J., Dec. 3, 2001, at 2-3 . The Bank Secrecy Act also requires that banks
file SARs when they are a party to a transaction of $5,000 or more "and the bank
knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect that the transaction involves funds
derived from illegal activities" or "the transaction has no business or apparent
lawful purpose or is not the sort in which the particular customer would normally
be expected to engage." Peter Carbonara, Dirty Money: Terrorism Has Shed New
Light on Global Money Laundering-Here's How It Works, Why It Exists and
Why the Proposed Government Crackdown Could Change the Way We All Do
Business, MONEY MAGAZINE, Jan. 1, 2002, at 90.
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in reporting high-risk activities, it also substantially raises the
stakes for non-compliance with federal money laundering
legislation and increases the scope of businesses now required to
participate in anti-money laundering efforts."
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the crime of money
laundering and summarizes some of the important provisions of
the IMLA Act. Part II analyzes how the money laundering
provisions of the Act will affect financial institutions and the public
in general, as well as a critique of how effective the IMLA Act will
be in the war against terrorism. In brief, this Note concludes that
while the IMLA Act will probably have certain unintended
benefits, such as the improved ability to target and prosecute drug
trafficking and tax evasion, it will be substantially ineffective in the
war on terrorism, and it will reduce the competitiveness of U.S.
financial institutions and other businesses to an extent that will
cause most critics to conclude that the Act's burdens outweigh its
benefits.
I. WHAT IS MONEY LAUNDERING?
A. The Three Stages of Money Laundering
Money laundering has been defined as "the process by which
one conceals the existence, illegal source, or illegal application of
income, and disguises that income to make it appear legitimate."'6
It has become a virtual requirement for large organized crime
groups to engage in money laundering, because it is the sustaining
force that enables drug-dealers, terrorist groups, and other
organized crime units to hide substantial amounts of wealth and to
perpetuate further criminal activity.'7
To understand the mechanics of money laundering
transactions, it helps to conceptualize a three-stage process.'8
15. See Goncharoff, supra note 13.
16. Kelly Neal Carpenter, Eighth Survey of White Collar Crime: Money
Laundering, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 813, 813 (1993).
17. See id. at 814.
18. See Scott Sultzer, Money Laundering: The Scope of the Problem and
Attempts to Combat It, 63 TENN. L. REv. 143, 145 (1995).
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"Placement," "layering," and "integration" are names that have
been used to describe these three stages.'9 "Placement" refers to
the initial step in which the cash proceeds from an illicit activity are
transferred to a legitimate business or a bank,' or are "converted
to negotiable instruments, such as cashier's checks, money orders,
or traveler's checks."'" Most of the crimes that the money
laundering statutes are intended to target are crimes that tend to
produce significant sums of cash, such as drug dealing.2 The sheer
weight and volume of the cash produced by such activities can
become impossibly cumbersome. For example, while a kilo of
heroin weighs about 2.2 pounds, the equivalent value of cash, in
small denomination bills, can weigh as much 256 pounds. 3 Among
the primary obstacles to simply depositing dirty funds in a bank
account are the provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970,24 which
requires that financial institutions file IRS Form 4789, Currency
Transaction Report, "whenever an individual or a person acting on
the individual's behalf conducts one or more cash transactions in a
single day which involve, in the aggregate, over $10,000." The
Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 also requires government reporting
when monetary instruments with a value exceeding $10,000 are
transported into or out of the United States. 6
One method frequently employed by money launderers is the
technique of "smurfing," whereby the placement stage is
accomplished by distributing illicit funds to numerous couriers who
make large numbers of deposits that avoid bank reporting
requirements. The placement stage of money laundering has also
19. See id.
20. See Teresa Adams, Tacking on Money Laundering Charges to White
Collar Crimes: What Did Congress Intend, and What Are the Courts Doing?, 17
GA. ST. U. L. REv. 531, 536 (2000).
21. Sultzer, supra note 18, at 149.
22. See id.
23. See William F. Bruton, Money Laundering: Is It Now a Corporate
Problem?, 17 DICK. J. INT'L L. 437, 440-41 (1999).
24. The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 114 (1970)
(codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5314, 5316-5324).
25. Sultzer, supra note 18, at 152-53.
26. See id. at 153.
27. See Louis Csoka, Combating Money Laundering: A Primer for Financial
Services Professionals, 20 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 311, 335-36 (2001).
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been accomplished by depositing funds with institutions like
casinos that do not have the strict reporting requirements that
banks have,' or to convert the funds to negotiable instruments
such as money orders or traveler's checks. 29  Another of the
unlimited number of placement techniques used by launderers is to
use dirty money to purchase inventory or supplies for an otherwise
legitimate business, or to simply purchase expensive items, such as
cars or boats, then to promptly sell the items and create a paper
trail that appears on the surface to be legal."
The placement stage of money laundering is the most risky for
criminals, because it entails the greatest likelihood of detection.31
Once dirty funds have been placed, the second stage in the money
laundering cycle, called "layering," can begin. This step typically
involves transferring funds by wire to offshore "shell" corporations
that have been carefully established so as to conceal the identity of
the parties in control.32 Countries that are frequently chosen for
such schemes include the Bahamas, Switzerland, the Cayman
Islands, Hong Kong, and other stable locales that have lenient
bank reporting laws.33  This is an ideal strategy for money
28. See Adams, supra note 20, at 536.
29. See Sultzer, supra note 18, at 149 (explaining that conversion of funds to
negotiable instruments has the added benefit of enabling the money launderer to
avoid detection under the Bank Secrecy Act's cash reporting requirements).
30. See Adams, supra note 20, at 536-37.
31. See Sultzer, supra note 18, at 149.
32. See Lisa A. Barbot, Money Laundering: An International Challenge, 3
TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 161, 167 (1995); see also Adams, supra note 20, at 537.
33. See Csoka, supra note 27, at 336; Barbot, supra note 32, at 167. But see
infra notes 78-94, 109-17 (discussing provisions of the Act intended to compel
offshore banking locales with lenient bank reporting laws to cooperate with U.S.
anti-money laundering efforts); Aline Sullivan, Shadows Lift on Sunny Havens:
Offshore Accounts Attract More Scrutiny From Tax Authorities, BARRON'S, Feb.
11, 2002, at 30 (discussing measures recently taken by U.S. regulators to get
popular offshore banking locales and tax havens to cooperate in the effort to
deter money laundering and tax evasion, and stating that "[f]or the first time,
U.S. regulators are shining harsh spotlights on the shady parts of some sunny
island nations. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
too, is cracking down on offshore tax havens, and those that remain on its
blacklist... may be subject to financial sanctions."); David Hardesty, Cayman
Islands Agrees to Share Tax Information (2001) (discussing an agreement
between the U.S. and the Cayman Islands that calls for granting access by U.S.
2003] 207
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launderers, because when the source of deposited funds is not
identified by the bank, the launderer's transfers become
untraceable." The task of detecting such a layering transaction in
the endless sea of daily wire transfers has been compared by
bankers to "searching for tainted dollars that mathematically
represent a grain of sand in the Sahara.""
Suspicious Activity Reports are a tool employed by financial
institutions and law enforcement authorities to improve the odds of
detecting illicit layering transactions.36 The Bank Secrecy Act
requires that banks file SARs when they are a party to a
transaction of $5,000 or more "and the bank knows, suspects, or
has reason to suspect that the transaction involves funds derived
from illegal activities" or "the transaction has no business or
apparent lawful purpose or is not the sort in which the particular
customer would normally be expected to engage. '"' Records of
SARs must be maintained on file, for inspection by the Treasury
Department and IRS.38
The final stage of any successful money laundering scheme is
known as "integration," and results in the laundered funds
returning to a status of expendability in the hands of the organized
crime group that generated them.39 The funds are typically used
directly to perpetuate further criminal activity or invested in
legitimate businesses that support organized crime. Depending
on the skill and care of the money launderer, the funds at this point
are generally safe from investigative authorities, because they have
traveled through a sufficient number of banks, shell companies,
tax authorities to Cayman Island bank accounts starting in 2004), available at
http://www.ecommercetax.com/doc/120901.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2002).
34. See Adams, supra note 20, at 537.
35. Sarah Jane Hughes, Policing Money Laundering Through Funds
Transfers: A Critique of Regulation Under The Bank Secrecy Act, 67 IND. L.J. 283,
307 (1992).
36. See Carbonara, supra note 14.
37. Id. To download SAR forms, visit
http://www.fincen.gov/bsafmain.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2002).
38. The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 101, 84 Stat. 114
(1970) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5314, 5316-5324).
39. See Adams, supra note 20, at 537-38.
40. See id.
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and investments to make the original source of the funds
untraceable.4
B. The 1986 Act
Recent estimates place the dollar volume of money laundered
in the United States at $600 billion annually," yet the act of money
laundering was not recognized as a crime in the United States until
passage of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 ("1986
Act").4 3  In brief, the 1986 Act extends criminal culpability to
anyone involved in a financial transaction who knows or has reason
to know that the funds involved were obtained illicitly.' The
legislative history indicates that the 1986 Act was intended to apply
not only to the parties directly involved in such a transaction, but
also to those who perform mere "ministerial duties" that comprise
the performance of a money laundering deal."
The 1986 Act is generally regarded as the legislation that first
made money laundering a criminal offense, 46 although the Bank
Secrecy Act of 1970 can be thought of as somewhat of a pre-cursor
to the 1986 Act. The 1986 Act has two sections, 1956 and 1957,
both of which apply to international transactions as well as purely
domestic ones. 7 Section 1956 has three main subdivisions which
address the topics of "transaction" money laundering,
"transportation" money laundering, and the authorization of
certain government sting operations.4 ' The term "specified
unlawful activity" is used in both Sections 1956 and 1957, and is
used to refer to any of an exhaustive list of offenses, including
41. See generally, Carbonara, supra note 14.
42 See Adams, supra note 20, at 531.
43. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), amended by
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §
726, 110 Stat. 1214, 1301-02 (1998); Adams, supra note 20, at 532.
44. See Carpenter, supra note 16, at 814.
45. See id.
46. See Peter J. Kacarab, An Indepth Analysis of the New Money Laundering
Statutes, 8 AKRON TAX J. 1 (1991) (stating that Congress has for the first time
acknowledged the criminal enterprises' penchant for money laundering).
47. See Adams, supra note 20, at 544.
48. See Daniel H. April & Angelo M. Grasso, Money Laundering, 38 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1051, 1054 (2001).
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drug-related crimes, kidnapping, arson, robbery, extortion,
smuggling, etc. 9
The transaction money laundering provisions of Section 1956
make it a crime to engage in four types of activity using illicitly
obtained funds: (1) engaging in financial transactions intended to
promote "specified unlawful activity;"5 (2) tax evasion;"1 (3)
conducting a financial transaction designed to conceal or disguise
the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds
of criminal activity; 2 and (4) engaging in a transaction with the
purpose of avoiding a state or federal reporting requirement. 3
The transportation money laundering provisions of Section
1956 encompass activities designed to move illegally obtained
funds into or out of the United States.54 There are three types of
transportation money laundering crimes: (1) transportation of dirty
money into or out of the U.S. for purposes of engaging in specified
illegal activity;" (2) transportation for the purpose of concealing or
disguising the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the
proceeds of criminal activity; 6 and (3) transportation of dirty
money into or out of the U.S. for the purpose of avoiding a state or
federal reporting requirement.
The third and final subdivision of Section 1956 addresses
money laundering transactions that occur as part of a government
sting operation." When a law enforcement officer represents that
funds have been obtained through a specified illegal activity,
Section 1956 makes it a crime to use such sting money to conduct,
or attempt to conduct, a financial transaction with the intent to do
any of the following: (1) promote a specified unlawful activity;59 (2)
conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or
49. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) (2001); 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(3) (2001).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i).
51. Id. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii).
52. Id. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).
53. Id. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii).
54. Id. § 1956(a)(2).
55. Id. § 1956(a)(2)(A).
56. Id. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i).
57. Id. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(ii).
58. Id. § 1956(a)(3).
59. Id. § 1956(a)(3)(A).
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control of such funds;' or (3) avoid a state or federal transaction
reporting requirement.6
Compared to the above Section 1956 provisions, Section 1957
of the 1986 Act is quite simple, making it a crime when one
"knowingly engages or attempts to engage in a monetary
transaction in criminally derived property that is of a value greater
than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity."62 The
scope of Section 1957 is frighteningly broad, as it is intended to
criminalize even the most ordinary of transactions involving
illegally derived funds, provided the $10,000 threshold is exceeded.
The legislative history of the 1986 Act's Section 1957, as explained
in United States v. Johnson, indicates that Section 1957 is aimed at
"those third persons-bankers, brokers, real estate agents, auto
dealers and others-who have aided [criminals] by allowing them
to dispose of the profits of [criminal] activity, yet whose conduct
has not been considered criminal under traditional conspiracy
law., 63 The broad scope of Section 1957 is due in part to the fact
that it lacks several of the key elements of Section 1956; most
notably it "does not require that the recipient exchange or launder
the funds, nor that he have any intent to further or conceal such an
activity. "'
The "knowledge" component of Sections 1956 and 1957 of the
1986 Act requires only that the defendant know that the funds
were acquired through some type of criminal conduct, and not
necessarily what type of conduct.65 The standard in both sections is
"actual" knowledge, as opposed to some lesser standard such as
"should have known" or "reckless disregard., 66 While actual
knowledge is often difficult to prove, courts seem to be in
agreement that it can be proven using only circumstantial
evidence.67 Furthermore, many courts have adopted the somewhat
60. Id. § 1956(a)(3)(B).
61. Id. § 1956(a)(3).
62. Id. § 1957(a).
63. United States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 562 (10th Cir. 1992).
64. Carpenter, supra note 16, at 824.
65. See April & Grasso, supra note 48, at 1058-59.
66. See id. at 1059.
67. See United States v. Heaps, 39 F.3d 479, 484 (4th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 848 (9th Cir. 1981).
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softer standard of allowing proof of "willful blindness" to
constitute actual knowledge.6" "Willful blindness" refers to the
concept of "conscious avoidance of knowledge," and the legislative
history of the 1986 Act indicates that "deliberately closing one's
eyes is tantamount to actual knowledge for purposes of the
laundering offenses, despite the ultimate wording of the statute. 69
Another key to understanding the money laundering
provisions of the 1986 Act is the concept of "tracing," which refers
to the prosecution's burden, in certain situations, of showing that
the funds that are the subject of an alleged money laundering
transaction originated from specified criminal activity.70  It is
generally agreed that Section 1956 does not require the
government to trace alleged money laundering funds back to a
68. See April & Grasso, supra note 48, at 1060. For example, in United States
v. Giraldi, 86 F.3d 1368 (5th Cir. 1996), the court upheld a private banker's
money laundering conviction when the prosecution proved the defendant's
willful blindness, based on the following findings:
[T]he banker did not follow "know-your-client" procedures and later lied about
it; the banker failed to investigate his client although he had a duty to do so; the
banker ignored false statements of his client about the source of the client's
funds; the banker failed to properly document the transactions on his client's
behalf; and the banker engaged in damage control once the federal
investigation began.
Csoka, supra note 27, at 326. It has been observed that judicial application of the
willful blindness doctrine in money laundering cases has been inconsistent and
somewhat arbitrary. See, e.g., Frans J. Von Kaenel, Willful Blindness: A
Permissible Substitute for Actual Knowledge Under the Money Laundering
Control Act?, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1189, 1209-13 (1993) (citing money laundering
cases that inconsistently apply the willful blindness doctrine and suggesting
amendments to the existing legislation that might prevent such inconsistencies).
69. Carpenter, supra note 16, at 828. The willful blindness doctrine has
particularly onerous implications for broker-dealers and other financial services
providers who perform transactions for clients in well-known money laundering
havens such as the Cayman Islands and the Bahamas. See, e.g., Betty Santangelo
et al., Money Laundering and Suspicious Activity Reporting: What's a Broker-
Dealer to Do?, 1046 PLI/CoRP 293, 300-03 (Apr. 1998) (inferring that courts
often construe activity in offshore money laundering havens to be inherently
suspicious, and therefore providers of financial services who perform transactions
in those locales appear to be more susceptible to application of the willful
blindness doctrine when charged with money laundering).
70. See Carpenter, supra note 16, at 839; April & Grasso supra note 48, at
1062-63.
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specific illegal act;7' this applies even when the defendant
commingles both clean and dirty funds in an account which is
subsequently used to finance an alleged laundering transaction.72
Section 1957, on the other hand, has been construed by some
courts as requiring the prosecution to trace allegedly laundered
funds when they have been commingled. For example, in United
States v. Rutgard,73 the court distinguished Section 1957 from
Section 1956, stating that Section 1957:
Does not create a presumption that any transfer of cash in an
account tainted by the presence of a small amount of fraudulent
proceeds must be a transfer of these proceeds .... To create
such a presumption in order to sustain a conviction under §
1957 would be to multiply many times the power of that
draconian law.74
Tracing has also been required in cases that require a defendant to
forfeit laundered funds.75
The penalties set forth in the 1986 Act are severe. A
conviction under Section 1956 carries a maximum criminal penalty
of twenty years in prison, a fine not to exceed the greater of
$500,000 or twice the value of the laundered funds, or both.76
Section 1957 provides for criminal penalties of up to ten years in
prison, a fine, or both.77 The two sections also carry identical civil
penalties, which are limited to the greater of $10,000 or the amount
of the funds laundered.78  Because each money laundering
transaction that affects interstate commerce is a separate indictable
offense,79 the penalties under Sections 1956 and 1957 can add up
quickly to result in extremely harsh punishment. The applicable
Senate Report states as follows:
71. See United States v. Blackman, 904 F.2d 1256, 1257 (8th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1991).
72. See Jackson, 935 F.2d at 840.
73. United States v. Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270 (9th Cir. 1997).
74. Id. at 1292-93.
75. See April & Grasso, supra note 48, at 1063-64.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2001).
77. Id. § 1957(b)(1).
78. Id. §§ 1956(b)(1)(A)-(B).
79. See Carpenter, supra note 16, at 835.
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[A] drug dealer who takes $1 million in cash from a drug sale
and divides the money into smaller lots and deposits it in 10
different banks (or in 10 different branches of the same bank)
on the same day has committed 10 distinct violations .... If he
then withdraws some of the money and uses it to purchase a
boat or condominium, he will have committed two more
violations, one for the withdrawal and one for the purchase.9
This notion that related yet distinct money laundering acts can
be separately indicted was challenged in United States v. Martin,8
and was upheld on the basis that each transaction under
consideration was a separate transaction for purposes of the 1986
Act, and each required examination of separate and distinct
evidence."
C. Money Laundering Provisions of the Act
Title III of the Act is named the International Money
Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001.83
It is divided into three subtitles: International Counter Money
Laundering (Subtitle A), ' Bank Secrecy Act Amendments and
Related Improvements (Subtitle B),85 and Currency Crimes and
Protection (Subtitle C).86 Title III has a total of forty-three
sections, and the following is a discussion of its most important
provisions.
1. Section 302: Findings and Purooses
Section 302 discusses the findings and purposes of Congress in
enacting Title III. It provides a general discussion regarding the
enormous costs that money laundering has inflicted on the world
80. April & Grasso, supra note 48, at n.110.
81. United States v. Martin, 933 F.2d 609 (8th Cir. 1991).
82. Id. at 611-12.
83. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 301-377,115 Stat. 272 (2001).
84. See id. § 311-330.
85. See id. § 351-366.
86. See id. § 371-377.
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economy, and cites an estimate by the International Monetary
Fund that money laundering amounts to between two and five
percent of the global gross domestic product.' Section 302 targets
offshore banking institutions as primary facilitators of money
laundering activities, due to their "weak financial supervisory and
enforcement regimes."88 Also targeted are "correspondent banking
facilities" and private banking services, which are recognized for
their frequent manipulation by money launderers and proclivity to
conceal the identities of account owners. Section 302 cites the
outmoded nature of some of the existing money laundering laws
and the need to tailor new legislation to curb terrorist activity,
instead of focusing with virtual exclusivity on drug-related
laundering.'
2. Section 311: Special Measures For Jurisdictions, Financial
Institutions, Or International Transactions Or Accounts Of Primary
Money Laundering Concern
Section 311 authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to require
domestic financial institutions and domestic financial agencies9 to
take any of five new "special measures" if, after consultation with
the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, the Secretary of
the Treasury finds that such action is warranted to deter a "primary
money laundering concern" imposed by sources outside the United
States.' The five new special measures would require domestic
financial institutions and financial agencies to (1) perform
87. See id. § 302(a)(1).
88. See id. § 302(a)(4).
89. See id. §§ 302(a)(6)-(7).
90. See id. § 302(b).
91. The term "financial institution" refers to any of a broad list of entities
summarized in 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2) (2002), including (1) insured banks, (2)
commercial banks, (3) an agency or branch of a foreign bank in the United
States, (4) a broker or dealer registered with the SEC, (5) investment banks, (6)
credit card issuers, (7) pawnbrokers, (8) the U.S. Postal Service, (9) sellers of cars
and other vehicles, (10) private banks, and (11) telegraph companies. See Betty
Santangelo et al., Summary of Anti-Money Laundering Provisions of USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001, n.3 (2001), available at http://www.srz.com/PDF-files/sec-
win02-santangelo.PDF (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
92. USA Patriot Act § 311(a)(1).
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additional record-keeping and reporting relative to transactions
identified as posing a "primary money laundering concern,"
including tracking the name and address of parties to such
transactions and identifying the legal capacity in which a party
acts;93 (2) identify the beneficial owner(s) of an account opened or
maintained in the United States by a foreign person;" (3) maintain
records of customers who make use of "payable-through"95
accounts connected to any foreign jurisdictions, financial
institutions, or classes of transactions that are of "primary money
laundering concern;"96 (4) identify customers who use interbank
"correspondent accounts"97 opened by a foreign bank at a U.S.
bank;98  and (5) prohibit the opening or maintenance of
correspondent and payable-through accounts involving a "primary
money laundering concern."99 Failure to comply with the above
"special measures" can result in stiff penalties totaling "not more
than two times the amount of the transaction, but not more than
$1,000,000."100
93. See id. § 311(b)(1); see also D. Jean Veta et al., Recent Developments in
Anti-Money Laundering Legislation: The International Money Laundering
Abatement and Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, 12 (2001), available at
http://www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/00004a3ctceeanffcdxnxesr/Money+Launderin
g+Report+Nov+1-01+JD97.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
94. USA Patriot Act § 311(b)(2).
95. Defined as:
[A]n account, including a transaction account (as defined in Section 19(b)(1)(C)
of the Federal Reserve Act), opened at a depository institution by a foreign
financial institution by means of which the foreign financial institution permits
its customers to engage, either directly or through a subaccount, in banking
activities usual in connection with the business of banking in the United States.
Id. § 311(e)(1)(C).
96. Id. § 311(b)(3).
97. Defined as "an account established to receive deposits from, make
payments on behalf of a foreign financial institution, or handle other financial
transactions related to such institution." Id. § 311(e)(1)(B).
98. Id. § 311(b)(4); see also, 147 CONG. REC. S10990-02 (2001).
99. USA Patriot Act § 311(b)(5).
100. Veta et al., supra note 93, at 14.
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3. Section 312: Special Due Diligence for Correspondent Accounts
and Private Banking Accounts
This Section took effect on July 23, 2002"' and requires U.S.
financial institutions to conduct enhanced due diligence procedures
with respect to correspondent accounts and private banking
accounts 02 that are maintained on behalf of non-United States
persons or their representatives. 3 The due diligence required
under this section involves maintenance of records identifying the
beneficial owners of such accounts and the source of funds
deposited; it also provides for the filing of a Suspicious Activity
Report ("SAR") when the situation warrants."M For private
banking accounts, "enhanced scrutiny" is required for the accounts
of senior foreign political figures, their close associates, and
immediate family."5  For correspondent accounts, additional
scrutiny is required to determine whether "the correspondent
foreign bank has correspondent banking relationships with other
foreign banks and, if so, the U.S. financial institution must identify
such other banks and conduct general due diligence.., with
respect to them." 6 A financial institution that fails to comply with
the provisions of Section 312 can incur the same penalties outlined
above under Section 311.' 7
101. See Santangelo et al., supra note 91, at 21.
102. Defined as:
[An account (or combination of accounts) that (i) requires a minimum
aggregate deposit of funds or other assets of not less than $1,000,000; (ii) is
established on behalf of one or more individuals who have a direct or beneficial
ownership interest in the account; and (iii) is assigned to, or administered or
managed by, in whole or in part, an officer, employee, or agent of a financial
institution acting as a liaison between the financial institution and the direct or
beneficial owner of the account.
USA Patriot Act § 311(b)(5).
103. See Veta et al., supra note 93, at 14-15.
104. See id. at 15-16.
105. See id. at 15.
106. DIVISION OF BANKING AND SUPERVISION AND REGULATION SR 01-29
(Nov. 26, 2001), available at
http://www.federaireserve.gov/boarddocs/SRLET'ERS/2001 (last visited Jan. 30,
2003).
107. See Veta et al., supra note 93, at 16.
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4. Section 314: Cooperative Efforts to Deter Money Laundering
This section directs the Secretary of the Treasury to issue
regulations on or before June 23, 2002 that provide guidelines
encouraging and enabling financial institutions and regulatory and
law enforcement agencies to share information about individuals
and entities suspected of terrorist acts and money laundering
activities."" Section 314 also grants financial institutions, upon
notifying the Secretary of the Treasury, the immediate authority to
share among themselves information about persons and entities
engaged in, or suspected of, terrorism or money laundering."9 The
Act provides that "such sharing generally will not constitute a
privacy violation of the applicable provisions of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act."10
5. Section 315: Inclusion of Foreign Corruption Offenses as Money
Laundering Crimes
This section expands the list of foreign crimes treated as
predicate acts required for a money laundering charge. Before the
IMLA Act, this list consisted only of drug trafficking, bank fraud,
and certain crimes of violence such as murder, robbery, extortion,
and the use of explosives."' Section 315 adds the following to the
list of acts that constitute a "specified illegal activity":
0 Bribery of a public official, or the misappropriation,
108. See Charles Doyle, Terrorism: Section By Section Analysis of the USA
PATRIOT Act, CRS Report for Congress (Dec. 10, 2001), 21, available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/7952.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
109. See The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 314(b), 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
110. DIVISION OF BANKING AND SUPERVISION AND REGULATION, supra note
106; USA Patriot Act § 314(c). The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act normally requires
that "financial institutions notify consumers before disclosing any non-public
personal information to non-affiliated third parties." Veta et al., supra note 93, at
23.
111. See David M. Nissman, Money Laundering (Feb. 18, 2001), 3, available at
http://www.corpusjurispublishing.com/Articles/moneylaundering.pdf (last visited
Jan. 30, 2003); USA Patriot Act § 319(a).
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theft, or embezzlement of public funds by or for the
benefit of a public official.
" Smuggling or export control violations involving an
item listed on the U.S. Munitions List, or an item
controlled under regulations under the Export
Administration Regulations."
" An offense for which the United States would be
obligated by a multilateral treaty, either to extradite
the alleged offender or to submit the case for
prosecution, if the offender were found within the
territory of the United States."'
Thus, individuals or groups caught using the proceeds of any
of the above activities in a U.S. financial transaction will be guilty
of money laundering provided there is the requisite intent (or if
more than $10,000 is exchanged)."'
6. Section 317: Long-Arm Jurisdiction Over Foreign Money
Launderers
The 1986 Act, discussed above,"6 defines the crime of money
laundering, but is silent with respect to jurisdiction over
foreigners."' Section 317 of the IMLA Act gives U.S. courts "long
arm" jurisdiction over foreign persons and foreign financial
institutions that commit money laundering acts that take place in
the United States, or, in the case of a financial institution, that
maintains a bank account at a financial institution in the United
States."8 Service of process must be made under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure or the laws of the country in which the foreign
112. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2002).
113. 15 C.F.R. §§ 730-774 (2002).
114. See Veta et al., supra note 93, at 30.
115. See Nissman, supra note 111, at 3.
116. See supra notes 43-82 and accompanying text.
117. See Veta et al., supra note 93, at 30.
118. See id. at 31.
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person is found.1'9
Section 317 has two other important provisions. The first gives
the U.S. jurisdiction over foreign persons who convert property to
their own use after such property has been ordered to be forfeited
as a result of a violation of U.S. money laundering laws." The
second allows U.S. courts to issue restraining orders to preserve
property in the U.S. and appoint a receiver to collect and take
possession of assets "in satisfaction of criminal or civil money
laundering or forfeiture judgments."2 '
7. Section 319: Forfeiture of Funds in United States Interbank
Accounts
Section 319 has several important provisions. The first allows
the U.S. government to seize funds and bring a forfeiture action on
accounts deposited in a foreign bank that has a correspondent
account in the United States when there is reasonable cause to
believe the funds are derived from criminal activity: "[T]he funds
deposited into the [foreign bank] shall be deemed to have been
deposited into the correspondent account in the United States, and
the government may seize, arrest or restrain the funds in the
correspondent account 'up to the value of the funds deposited' into
the foreign bank.' ' 22 The government is not required to establish
that the funds seized are directly traceable to the funds deposited
with the foreign bank.2 3 Moreover, while it was previously possible
for the foreign bank in this type of situation to subvert such
forfeiture actions by claiming ownership of the funds, Section 319
precludes such measures in most cases. 4
Section 319 also establishes the "120 hour rule" which requires
119. See id.
120. See The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 317, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); see also Nissman, supra note
111, at 4.
121. See 147 CONG. REC. S10990-02 (2001); see also Santangelo et al., supra
note 91, at 31.
122. Nissman, supra note 111, at 5.
123. See USA Patriot Act § 319(a).
124. See Nissman, supra note 111, at 5.
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"covered financial institutions"" to provide federal banking
agencies with information related to anti-money laundering
compliance not later than 120 hours after receiving a request to
produce such information."6  This provision pertains to "all
accounts at a covered financial institution and not just accounts of
foreign persons or non-citizens," and does not require court
approval."
Lastly, Section 319 vests the Secretary of the Treasury and the
Attorney General with the power to summon and subpoena
records of foreign banks that have correspondent accounts in the
United States, and request records relating to such accounts,
including records maintained outside the United States relating to
the deposit of funds into a foreign bank."' Thus, this section
provides U.S. authorities with the power to circumvent mutual
legal assistance treaties and "other procedures dependent on
cooperation of foreign governments." '29  It also sets forth civil
penalties of up to $10,000 per day on U.S. banks that maintain
correspondent accounts for foreign banks that fail to comply with
such a summons or subpoena.13 °
8. Section 326: Verification of Identification
Section 326 of the Act will have a significant impact on the
operations of financial institutions, as it requires the Secretary of
the Treasury to issue regulations setting minimum standards for
verification of customers' identities.' These new regulations must
be issued on or before October 26, 2002," and will require
125. Defined to include insured banks, commercial banks and trust companies,
private banks, agencies or branches of foreign banks in the United States, and
thrift institutions. Santangelo et al., supra note 91, at 27.
126. USA Patriot Act § 319(b).
127. Mark A. Rush & Heather Hacket, USA Patriot Act-Money Laundering
and Asset Forfeiture, available at
http://www.kl.com/practiceareas/wccrime/publications/asset-forfeiture.pdf (last
visited Feb. 2, 2003).
128. USA Patriot Act § 319(b).
129. Nissman, supra note 111, at 5.
130. See Rush & Hacket, supra note 127, at 10.
131. USA Patriot Act § 326(a).
132. 147 CONG. REc. S10990-02 (2001).
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financial institutions to verify customers' identities, maintain
records relating to identity verification, and consult lists of known
or suspected terrorists.1
9. Section 351: Amendments Relating to Reporting of Suspicious
Activities
As noted above, the Act provides various measures requiring
financial institutions to submit suspicious activity reports to the
federal government."" Section 351 of the Act deals with the
liability of financial institutions for such reports. The Bank Secrecy
Act provides immunity from civil liability to financial institutions
and their officers, directors, employees, and agents who report
suspicious activities.'35 Such immunity provides protection from any
"person" under the Bank Secrecy Act ("BSA"), but Section 351 of
the IMLA Act amends the BSA to exclude governments and
government agencies from the definition of "person.', 136 This
section was presumably enacted to give financial institutions some
degree of accountability relative to their duty to file SARs, while
continuing to grant financial institutions immunity from the
individuals and entities that are the subject of the SARs.
10. Section 352: Anti-Money Laundering Programs
Section 352 requires financial institutions to institute anti-
money laundering programs that have the following characteristics:
(i) the development of internal policies, procedures, and
controls;
(ii) the designation of a compliance officer;
(iii) an ongoing employee training program; and
133. See Santangelo et al., supra note 91, at 31.
134. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
135. See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(3) (2001); Rush & Hacket, supra note 127, at 13.
136. See USA Patriot Act § 351(a); Veta et al., supra note 93, at 18.
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(iv) an independent audit function to test programs."'
This section took effect on April 24, 2002138 and requires the
Secretary of the Treasury to issue, on or before that date,
regulations that "consider the extent to which the requirements
imposed under this section are commensurate with the size,
location, and activities of the financial institutions to which such
regulations apply."'39 It is anticipated by some that the Secretary
will use this provision of the Act to allow certain "non-regulated
service providers such as real estate closing agents and vehicle
sellers," which are included in the Act's definition of "financial
institution," to adopt less cumbersome anti-money laundering
programs than those that will be required of entities that fit the
traditional definition of the term "financial institution.
1
'4
Moreover, it is expected that large, traditional financial institutions
with operations overseas are expected to have more sophisticated
anti-money laundering programs than smaller, strictly domestic
ones.1
4 1
The financial services industry will wait anxiously as Section
352 takes its ultimate shape over the coming months. Most large,
traditional financial institutions have had anti-money laundering
programs in place for many years, and they have incurred
significant costs in doing so.*'2 While most financial institutions, at
least for the time being, seem to be taking a patriotic "grin and
bear it" attitude to the money laundering provisions of the Act, a
few have expressed concern over the additional costs they expect
to incur.'43 International Bank of Commerce ("IBC"), based in
Laredo, Texas, has had a "know your customer policy" in place for
twenty years, and it processed roughly 40,000 currency transaction
reports in the year 2000.'" IBC already spends about $700,000 a
137. USA Patriot Act § 352(a).
138. See Santangelo et al., supra note 91, at 34.
139. USA Patriot Act § 352(c).
140. Rush & Hacket, supra note 127, at 14.
141. See id. at 15.
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year investigating and reporting suspicious transactions, and has
"complained that the new act's requirement to investigate the
bank's customer list would be a daunting and expensive
proposition, involving some 1 million accounts."''
11. Section 359: Reporting of Suspicious Activities By Underground
Banking Systems
Although this section of the Act does not specifically use the
term "hawala," it is primarily intended to expand the definition of
"financial institution," as that term is used in the money laundering
statutes, to include hawalas and other informal banking systems.
14 6
Specifically, Section 359 amends the definition of "financial
institution" to include:
[A] licensed sender of money or any other person who engages
as a business in the transmission of funds, including through an
informal value transfer banking system or network of people
facilitating the transfer of value domestically or internationally
outside of the conventional financial institutions system.1
47
Section 359 also directs the Secretary of the Treasury to issue a
report to Congress on or before October 26, 2002 detailing the
need for any additional legislation regarding the regulation of
informal banking networks.'
12. Section 361: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network ("FinCEN") has
been in existence since 1990, when it was created by an order from
the Secretary of the Treasury,' 9 and has served primarily as a
"clearinghouse for financial information" such as the CTRs and
145. Id.
146. See Santangelo et al., supra note 91, at 37.
147. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 359(a), 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
148. See id. § 359(d);.Veta et al., supra note 93, at 40.
149. See Veta et al., supra note 93, at 35.
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SARs filed by financial institutions.5 °  FinCEN has often been
criticized for its inefficiency, but it is hoped that changes made by
the IMLA Act will help it shed this image and become an effective
contributor to the war on money laundering.'"' The IMLA Act
specifies the responsibilities of FinCEN's director, "significantly
expands" the duties of FinCEN,'52 and, for the first time, gives it
statutory authority to perform its functions. '53 However, one has to
wonder whether FinCEN's skimpy 2003 budget of $52.3 million
will allow it to fulfill the lofty new role that Congress has given it.'5
13. Section 371: Bulk Cash Snuggling Into or Out of the United
States
Under existing currency reporting laws, one must declare cash
or other monetary instruments when they are transported into or
150. See Scott Bernard Nelson, The Money Trail War on Terrorism Gives
Financial Crimes Unit New Stature, Challenges, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 5, 2001, at
Fl.
151. See id.
152. The expanded duties of FinCEN have been summarized as follows:
Maintaining a government-wide data access service, with access, in accordance
with applicable legal requirements, to: (a) information collected by the
Department of the Treasury, including CTRs, SARs, and CMIRs; (b)
information regarding national and international currency flows; (c) other
records and data maintained by other federal, state, local, and foreign agencies,
including financial and other records developed in specific cases; and (d) other
privately and publicly available information; Analyzing and disseminating the
available data in accordance with legal requirements and policies and guidelines
by the Secretary and the Under Secretary for Enforcement to: (a) identify
possible criminal activity to appropriate law enforcement agencies; (b) support
ongoing criminal financial investigations and prosecutions; (c) identify possible
instances of financial non-compliance for enforcement by other federal
financial agencies; (d) evaluate and recommend possible uses of special
currency reporting requirements under 31 U.S.C. § 5326; (e) determine
emerging trends and methods in money laundering and other financial crimes;
(f) support the conduct of intelligence or counter-intelligence activities to
protect against international terrorism; and (g) support government initiatives
against money laundering.
Veta et al., supra note 93, at 35-36.
153. See id. at 36.
154. See Jeannine Aversa, Official: More Terrorist Money Frozen, AP
ONLINE, Jan. 22, 2002, available at 2002 WL 10034136. The 2003 budget
represents a 6.3% increase over the prior year. Id.
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out of the United States. 5 Section 371 of the IMLA Act creates
the new criminal offense of bulk cash smuggling. '56 It applies to
individuals who knowingly conceal more than $10,000 in currency
in any fashion in an attempt to evade currency reporting
requirements and who transport, or attempt to transport, such
currency into or out of the United States. 7 According to one
author, this section "elevates the seriousness of smuggling currency
into or out of the United States to the same level as the smuggling
of firearms, jewels or counterfeit merchandise." ' 8 Violation of this
section of the Act carries a penalty of up to five years
imprisonment and forfeiture of any property used in or traceable
to the offense.'59
Interestingly, some reports have indicated that the September
11 hijackings were at least partially funded by cash that was legally
transported and declared into the United States." The Washington
Post reported that:
[T]wo of the 'hijackers, Ahmed Alghamdi and Mohand
Alshehri, may have brought large amounts of cash into the
country in person-even adhering to customs rules that require
travelers to declare at least $10,000 in cash. A man with
Alghamdi's name declared $14,000 on Aug. 10 in Newark, while
a man listing his name as Alshehri declared $20,000 on Aug. 14
in Atlanta. 6 '
The same article reports that many of the hijackers and their
supporters opened bank accounts in the United States using their
passports and visas, rather than social security numbers, which
made it impossible for banks to run credit and identity checks.
62
155. See Doyle, supra note 108, at 30.
156. See id.
157. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 371(c), 115 Stat. 272 (2001); Nissman, supra note 111, at 7.
158. Nissman, supra note 111, at 7.
159. USA Patriot Act § 371(c).
160. See Dan Eggen & Kathleen Day, U.S. Ties Hijackers' Money to Al




Thus, while the bulk cash smuggling provisions of the IMLA Act
(Section 371) will do nothing to deter similar future movements of
legally declared cash into the U.S., it is possible that the Act's
identity verification provisions (Section 326) and/or general anti-
money laundering awareness requirements (e.g., Sections 352, 359,
361) will be effective at preventing similar movements of funds by
individuals with ties to terrorist organizations.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE IMLA ACT: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
OF THE ACT AND THE FUTURE OF MONEY LAUNDERING
A. Initial Responses to the Act: Will It Accomplish What the
Previous Legislation Did Not?
Perhaps due to a fear of being perceived as unpatriotic, critics
of the Act's money laundering provisions have remained
surprisingly mute. Most of the criticism levied on the Act to date
has been aimed at the constitutionality of its surveillance and
immigration provisions. '63  Nevertheless, the Act's money
laundering provisions have not remained completely unscathed.
Some consider them to be an administrative burden with great
potential to decrease the competitiveness of U.S. "financial
institutions," as that word is loosely defined in the Act, without
noticeably curtailing terrorism and other forms of organized
crime.' Others have argued that the Act is unconstitutionally
vague, and that courts will be unable to determine Congress' intent
163. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., Matthew Haggman, Law Targeting Terrorist Funding Sources
Proves to Be Windfall for Professional Services Firms, PALM BEACH DAILY Bus.
REV., July 1, 2002, at 6 ("Like many experts, former federal prosecutor Sharon
L. Kegerreis doubts that the anti-money laundering provisions of the Act will do
much to interfere with international terrorists' ability to fund their operations.
'This is like trying to eradicate coca in Colombia,' says Kegerreis."); Jeremy
Quittner, Gauging the New Law's Consumer Impact, AMERICAN BANKER, Apr.
23, 2002, at 11 (citing concerns by some in the banking industry that the Act will
"impose additional burdens on the already limited compliance resources of
community-based financial institutions," and "[t]here is a disproportionate
burden on institutions that are least likely to be involved in money laundering.").
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due to the Act's scant legislative history.'65 Another viewpoint is
that a public backlash will occur when members of the general
public realize that financial institutions now have the right to probe
and control their private lives to an alarming degree. 66
The existing legislation has done surprisingly little to deter
money laundering, especially the international variety, since the
crime of money laundering was first established by Sections 1956
and 1957 of the 1986 Act. Since its enactment, "just over 100 cases
have been brought in federal court which resulted in a conviction
under § 1956(a)(2),' 67 and "[o]n the domestic front, U.S.
Department of Justice figures show that from 1987 to 1995, only
3,000 money laundering cases, against 7,300 defendants, were filed,
yielding 580 guilty verdicts and 2,295 guilty pleas. 1 61 Whether the
money laundering provisions of the Act will bring about significant
improvements remains to be seen, but Congress' lack of care in
formulating the Act does not instill confidence:
Congress' so-called deliberative process was reduced to this-
closed door negotiations; no conference committee; no
committee reports; no final hearing at which opponents could
testify; not even an opportunity for most of the legislators to
read the 131 single-spaced pages about to become law. Indeed,
for part of the time, both the House and Senate were closed
because of the anthrax scare; congressional staffers weren't able
165. See Robert A. Levy, The USA Patriot Act: We Deserve Better, available at
http://www.cato.org/current/terrorism/pubs/levy-martial-law.html (last visited
Jan. 30, 2003).
166. See, e.g., Investigating Patterns of Terrorism Financing: Testimony of John
A. Herrera on Behalf of the Credit Union National Association (CUNA) and
World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU) (Feb. 12, 2002) (discussing the Act's
potential impact on financial institutions' "know your customer" policies and the
detrimental effects they may have on minorities), available at 2002 WL 25098874
[hereinafter John A. Herrera Testimony] (statement of John A. Herrera, Vice
President for Latino/Hispanic Affairs, Self-Help Credit Union and Board Chair
of the Latino Community Credit Union (LCCU)).
167. Madelyn J. Daley, Effectiveness of United States and International Efforts
to Combat International Money Laundering, 2000 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW
TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 175,194 (2000).
168. Diane Marie Amann, Spotting Money Launderers: A Better Way to Fight
Organized Crime?, 27 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 199, 227 (2002).
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to access their working papers. "9
There is little doubt that there will be a high price to pay for
the additional security the IMLA Act is intended to provide. It has
been estimated that the new reporting rules will cause banks in
Florida alone to lose $18 billion to $34 billion of the $49 billion
they presently hold in accounts of non-resident aliens.
1 70
Many provisions of the Act are maddeningly vague; in fact
some critics have contended that the Act as a whole should be
declared unconstitutionally vague. 7' It seems highly unlikely,
however, that the Act will be overturned, and it should be noted
that numerous sections require interpretive regulations to be
issued. Nevertheless, the Act's negligible legislative history will
make it difficult for courts to discern the intent of Congress.'
B. Impact of the Act on Financial Institutions and Other Businesses
The IMLA Act conscripts into service numerous entities that
previously had limited or no involvement in the fight against
money laundering. For example, Section 365 of the Act requires
all businesses, not just financial institutions, to file a CTR with the
federal government for every cash transaction in excess of
$10,000.'7' Broker-dealers will have a similarly expanded role in
anti-money laundering efforts. While broker-dealers have long
169. Levy, supra note 165.
170. See FIRST WATCH, "Money Laundering!": How Does It Work and How
Does It Affect US. Citizens?, (Nov. 2001), available at
http://www.firsttradenet.com/its/newsletter/pdf/NewsletterNOV.pdf (last visited
Feb. 22,2002).
As early as 1998, alleged terrorist mastermind Osama bin Laden was linked in
congressional testimony to money laundering. Despite many hearings in recent
years, financial institutions helped kill several measures to tighten controls.
Members of Congress who waged war for enhanced money-laundering laws say
they tried but failed to overcome powerful financial institution lobbyists that
pumped $350 million into political campaigns since 1990.
Id.
171. See Levy, supra note 165.
172. See id.
173. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 365(a), 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
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been subject to the same CTR filing requirements as banks, they
have not been compelled to file SARs.'74 This exemption, however,
is expected to change pursuant to prioposed rules filed by the
Treasury Department on December 21, 2001.' 75 "Given the
proposed $5,000 threshold for suspicious activity reporting and the
breadth of instances in which reports are required, broker-dealers
will need to significantly increase due diligence activities regarding
account transactions."'76  Broker-dealers have also never been
legally obligated to conduct "know your customer" procedures,
although the industry has strongly encouraged such activities for
many years. '77 This, too, will soon change as broker-dealers are
included among those who, under Section 326 of the Act, must
follow the Treasury Department's guidelines regarding identity
verification and record-keeping.'78
It seems ironic that the nation's financial institutions now seem
to be publicly embracing legislation that they have spent years
trying to defeat. Banks and other members of the financial
services industry have spent the last decade lobbying against stiffer
money laundering regulations,'79  presumably because such
legislation has the potential to create administrative burdens that
can require significant compliance expenditures. Passage of the
IMLA Act has created concerns among industry analysts regarding
the ability of U.S. financial institutions to compete
internationally."' Nevertheless, John J. Byrne, Senior Counsel and
Compliance Manager of the American Bankers Association,
recently claimed, "[t]he banking industry strongly supported Title
174. See William J. Sweet et al., The USA Patriot Act of 2001 Impact on
Broker-Dealers: Statutory, Regulatory and Compliance Lessons From Banks'
Experience with Bank Secrecy Act and Anti-Money Laundering Enforcement,
1289 PLI/CORP 139, 144-45 (Jan. 23, 2002).
175. See id. at 161-62.
176. Id. at 164.
177. See id. at 149-50.
178. See id. at 150; see also supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
179. See FIRST WATCH, supra note 170, at 2; Lauren Bielski, Technology to the
Rescue?: OFA C Lists and Related Anti- Terror Requirements Increase Demand for
Tools That Can Monitor a Variety of Frauds, A.B.A. BANKING J., Jan. 1, 2002, at
37.
180. See Marketplace Morning Report (Minnesota Public Radio, Dec. 31,
2001).
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III of the USA Patriot Act,""'8 and Charlotte Bahin, regulatory
counsel for America's Community Bankers, stated "in spite of the
inevitability of new regulatory requirements associated with the
act, I haven't heard anybody complain., 18 2 It seems that banks and
other financial services providers, at least for the time being, are
willing to do what is perceived as their patriotic duty; or perhaps
some might be concerned about the public relations backlash that
might occur if they opposed the IMLA Act's provisions.
Banks were already saddled with enormous financial reporting
requirements prior to the passage of the Act. The Bank Secrecy
Act, for example, requires banks to file currency transaction
reports for all cash deposits and withdrawals in excess of $10,000 (a
threshold, incidentally, that has not changed since the passage of
the BSA in the 1970s).183 This requirement results in a monumental
amount of paperwork for the government to process, in addition to
substantial fines for non-compliant banks, such as the $10 million
U.S. Trust recently paid."M Nearly thirteen million CTRs are filed
each year, and the sentiment shared by many bankers is that they
are "virtually useless."'85  Naturally, this viewpoint might be
colored somewhat by the fact that financial institutions are not
typically permitted to observe how the CTRs they file are
ultimately used in criminal investigations, or even which ones are
181. Investigating Patterns of Terrorism Financing: Testimony of John J. Byrne
on Behalf of the American Bankers Association Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Financial Services United States
House of Representatives, 107th Congress (2002) [hereinafter John J. Byrne
Testimony] (statement of Senior Counsel and Compliance Manager of the
American Bankers Association).
182. Banking Daily, Federal Banking Regulatory Agendas Dominated by USA
Patriot Act Rulemaking (Jan. 23, 2002), available at
http://www.cbanet.org/Issues/documents/outlook2002.pdf (last visited Jan. 30,
2003).
183. See Geoffrey M. Connor, Banking Aspects of the USA PATRIOT Act,
N.J. L.J., Dec. 3, 2001, at 2-3.
184. See id. at 3.
185. Krysten Crawford, Drawing a Bead on Terrorism Funds: Financial Fight
May Be Mission Impossible, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 28,2002, at 1. Clearly, CTRs and
SARs have proven useful in establishing a paper trail that presents evidence of
money laundering. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 20, at 539 (discussing the use of
CTRs by prosecutors in money laundering cases).
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used.'86 Clearly, a different view is held by prosecutors who rely
heavily on CTRs and SARs to establish money laundering paper
trails."'
Despite the regulatory burdens already faced by banks, the
Act not only expands the definition of "financial institution," it
greatly expands the due diligence measures required of such
organizations.'88 It also provides substantial incentives to err on the
side of maximum reporting, since the Act now allows for financial
institutions to be held liable for failure to identify terrorist
activities, and it grants financial institutions immunity from the
individuals and entities that are thesubject of CTRs and SARs.'89
According to some experts, the additional expense and time
required by these regulations hardly seems justified. James
Rockett, a San Francisco bank attorney, recently had this to say
about the Act's enhanced regulatory burdens on banks: "[t]he
popular myth is that this will allow [the government] to identify
terrorist activities .... I think that belief is misplaced. The more
likely impact on banks is that they're not going to be able to
identify terrorists any better, but they're going to be held
accountable."'" Furthermore, while the filing requirements for
186. See Todd Stern et al., The Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-
Terrorist Financing Act of 2001, 119 BANKING L.J. 1, 7 (2002). Nevertheless,
"during a three-year period ending in fiscal 1997, for instance, the IRS initiated
fewer than 1,000 investigations based on CTRs and suspicious-activity reports,
despite the filing of around 35 million CTRs." Michael Allen, U.S. to Cut Bank
Reports on Cash Deals, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 1998, at A3.
187. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 20, at 539 (discussing the use of CTRs by
prosecutors in money laundering cases).
188. See generally Joseph J. Norton, Money Laundering Law and Terrorist
Financing: Post-September 11 Responses-Let Us Step Back and Take a Deep
Breath?, 36 INT'L L. 103, 119-21 (2002) (discussing the due diligence
requirements of financial institutions under the Act).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 135-36. However, the Act does not
provide immunity from civil or criminal actions brought by any government or
governmental agency to enforce any constitution, law, or regulation. See The
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-56, § 351(a), 115 Stat. 272 (2001); Veta et al., supra note 93, at 18.
190. Michael A. Hiltzik, Response to Terror: A Changed America, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 13, 2002, at Al.
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CTRs remain fairly concrete, the type of "suspicious" activity that
compels the filing of a SAR remains nebulous and primarily
subjective.91  "The head of the Treasury's Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network has been quoted as saying the decision to
report will often come down to 'a hunch."" 92 With heavy penalties
at stake for financial institutions that fail to identify suspicious
activities, one would think that more clearly definable standards
would be established.
Another aspect of the Act that has received criticism is its
failure to adequately address money laundering that occurs
through informal banking systems such as hawalas and the black
market peso exchange. Hawalas have been around for centuries,
and are used primarily in the Middle East and parts of Asia to
serve as unlicensed, unregulated banks that engage in paperless
monetary transfers.'93 The U.S. Treasury has specifically identified
Pakistan, India, and Dubai as the "hawala triangle," as these areas
of the globe have unusually high reliance on hawala systems.94 The
typical hawala operates as follows: an individual who wishes to
transfer money to a target individual gives the funds to a hawala
dealer and provides him with a code.'95 The dealer contacts one of
his associates near the target individual, who is granted access to
the funds upon furnishing the appropriate code.'96 The dealer and
his associate typically engage in a series of similar transactions, and
settle up their debts on a periodic basis.'" A typical transaction,
however, is untraceable because there is no wiring of funds or
transfer of cash between the dealer and his associate, and record-
191. See Patti Waldmeir, Inside Track- Unaccustomed WarriOrs-A New Law
in the U.S. Will Draft Thousands of Businesses Into the Fight Against Terrorism,
FINANCIALTIMES, Mar. 21, 2002, available at 2002 WL 16943248.
192. Id.
193. See Kavita Natarajan, Combatting India's Heroin Trade Through Anti-
Money Laundering Legislation, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 2014, 2021 (1998); Ed
Blanche, The Labyrinthian Money Trail of Osama bin Laden: President George
W. Bush Is Committed to Separating Osama bin Laden from His Financial
Support-but Before He Can Confiscate It, First He Must Find It, MIDDLE EAST,
Jan. 1, 2002, at 22.
194. See Blanche, supra note 193, at 22.
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keeping is minimal, if not non-existent.'98
As discussed, above, Section 359 of the Act expands the
definition of "financial institution" to include hawalas and other
informal banking systems.'99 Stefan D. Cassella, the assistant chief
of the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section of the U.S.
Department of Justice, feels that Congress should have done more
to address the problems presented by hawalas and other
unregulated financial entities.2' For example, Cassella suggests
that Congress, in passing the IMLA Act, failed to close a loophole
in the law that arguably allows every hawala-type transaction to
escape the statutory definition of money laundering."' Under the
existing law, a financial transaction must involve criminal proceeds
to constitute money laundering, and Cassella indicates that the
parallel, yet separate, transactions that characterize all hawala
transfers could be construed by courts as not technically
constituting money laundering. 2 Cassella points to United States v.
Covey as an example of a case involving such parallel transactions
that did produce a criminal conviction, but he nevertheless
proposes "an amendment that says that, if a financial transaction
involves criminal proceeds, then any parallel transaction, or
transaction that completes or complements that transaction,
involves [criminal] proceeds as well. Closing this potential
loophole would nip a major international money laundering
problem in the bud."2 3
Another flaw of the IMLA Act that will reduce its
effectiveness is its failure to adequately address the threat posed by
individuals who launder funds using the internet and other
unregulated digital payment systems. The worldwide proliferation
of internet usage has resulted in the emergence of various non-
traditional payment systems that can be anonymously utilized and
virtually impossible to trace.' Money launderers have increasingly
198. See Blanche, supra note 193, at 22.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 146-48.
200. See Stefan D. Cassella, Money Laundering Has Gone Global: It's Time to
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turned to such digital payment systems as their preferred means to
hide criminally derived proceeds. 5 However, the IMLA Act does
not specifically regulate digital payment systems, which have been
described as having the capacity to "eliminate the effectiveness of
laws that establish paper trails.""2 6  For example, "money
transferred from a bank account onto a [stored value card]0 7 at an
ATM or through an electronic wallet connected to a personal
computer can be transferred anywhere in the world without a
single reporting requirement.""2 Stanley Morris, Director of the
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, "has expressed concern
about 'anonymous international cash flows' made possible by the
worldwide web. 'These new technologies can make it possible to
conduct large-scale transactions instantaneously, remotely, and
anonymously, and they may permit such transactions to take place
without the involvement of traditional financial institutions.""'2 9 It
seems that Congress has missed the boat by continuing to turn a
blind eye to technologically advanced laundering techniques and
choosing instead to remain in the twentieth century. It is difficult
to imagine that crime and terrorism will be significantly impacted
by antiquated and unimaginative laws such as the "know your
customer" provisions of Section 326,210 the bulk cash smuggling
provisions of Section 371,211 and the modestly expanded role of
Launderers?, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 685, 688 (1998).
205. See id.
206. Christopher D. Hoffman, Encrypted Digital Cash Transfers: Why
Traditional Money Laundering Controls May Fail Without Uniform
Cryptography Regulations, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 799, 856 (1998).
207. Hoffman, supra note 206, at 813.
Stored value cards, also known as smart cards, hold a prepaid amount of funds
that consumers can access by inserting the card into a device called the point of
sale terminal. Merchants can transfer the funds accumulated at the terminal to a
bank account by telephone. One type of stored value card, the magnetic-stripe
card, can be used at terminals mounted on photocopiers or laundry machines.
Commuters in New York, San Francisco, and Washington D.C. can use
magnetic-stripe cards to pay mass transit fares.
Id.
208. Id. at 856.
209. Id.
210. See supra notes 131-33and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 155-62 and accompanying text.
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FinCEN as provided in Section 361." '
A number of solutions have been proposed that would enable
law enforcement authorities to more effectively combat money
laundering that occurs through such non-traditional channels.
These remedies include: (1) amending the existing money
laundering statutes to allow them to encompass emerging
technologies; "' (2) re-defining the focus of money laundering
legislation to target not just "financial institutions" but also non-
financial institutions that facilitate or engage in such digital
monetary transfers;"' and (3) providing law enforcement
authorities with access to digital cryptographic keys."5 This last
solution is riddled with privacy invasion issues, which could be
avoided somewhat by allowing key escrow agencies to maintain
"records of all cryptographic keys in use by the public and
releasing them under judicial subpoena."" 6
Another criticism of the IMLA Act is that when financial
institutions put into place the "know your customer" policies
required by the Act, many Americans may find them to be
intrusive or even discriminatory. John A. Herrera, Vice President
for Latino/Hispanic Affairs, Self-Help Credit Union and Board
Chair of the Latino Community Credit Union, recently testified
before Congress expressing his concerns that vital financial
institution services are likely to be denied to legal immigrants, for
example, because they may not be eligible to obtain a social
security number and thus not able to furnish information required
by some banks and credit unions to open an account. 7 Herrera's
statement included the following points:
The lack of certainty in the current regulatory environment
results in many banks not welcoming immigrants... . Since
September 11, members of credit unions have begun
encountering problems in obtaining individual tax identification
numbers so that they can open accounts, earn interest and pay
212. See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text.
213. See Saxena, supra note 204, at 717-18.
214. See id.
215. See Hoffman, supra note 206, at 802-03.
216. See id.
217. See John A. Herrera Testimony, supra note 166.
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taxes .... We believe it is imperative that policymakers do not
develop rules that will result in unreasonable obstacles to
serving our members. 18
Herrera was particularly concerned about Section 326 of the
Act,219 which requires the Secretary of the Treasury to issue
regulations setting minimum standards for verification of
customers' identities. 22° These new regulations must be issued on
or before October 26, 2002,22' and will require financial institutions
to verify customers' identities, maintain records relating to identity
verification, and consult lists of known or suspected terrorists. 22
Herrera indicated that individuals who are denied basic banking
services are unable to earn interest, more likely to be victims of
violent crime (due to their resultant increase in cash holdings), and
are susceptible to the inequities of predatory lenders.2z
C. Will the IMLA Act Really Help Stop Terrorism?
The Act's Title III anti-money laundering provisions were
enacted in large part due to the belief that terrorist groups, like
Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda, are becoming increasingly
sophisticated and well-financed. 24  Some reports of al Qaeda's
financial savvy have been greatly exaggerated, however. For
example, shortly after the September 11 attacks, federal and
international authorities began investigating reports that the
terrorists had made strategic investments designed to profit from
the attacks.2' The investigations focused on suspicious short sales
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 326(a), 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
221. See 147 CONG. REC. S10990-02 (2001).
222. See Santangelo et al., supra note 91, at 31.
223. John A. Herrera Testimony, supra note 166.
224. See USA Patriot Act § 302(a) (stating that "money laundering, and the
defects in financial transparency on which money launderers rely, are critical to
the financing of global terrorism and the provision of funds for terrorist
attacks.").
225. See Michael Kranish, Tracking Money Behind Plot, BOSTON GLOBE,
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of certain airline and insurance company stocks that occurred
shortly before September 11.226 Munich Re, a German insurance
company which issued numerous insurance policies for tenants of
the World Trade Centers, saw its stock fall twelve percent on the
four days prior to the attacks and fifteen percent on September
11.227 Newspaper headlines during the days following the attacks
were filled with stories alleging how the terrorists appeared to have
financially benefited from their actions, but the allegations
ultimately proved to be largely without merit."' The New York
Times reported as follows on September 28, 2001:
After almost two weeks of investigation, financial regulators
around the world have found no hard evidence that people with
advance knowledge of the terrorist attacks in New York and
Washington used that information to profit in the international
securities markets. And a number of officials are beginning to
express doubt that such a plan existed."'
Some of the most suspicious and heavily investigated short
trading activity on airline stocks turned out to have been done by
another airline as part of a common hedging strategy to protect
from economic downturns in the industry. The coincidental
decline of Munich Re's stock price shortly before the attacks has
since been attributed to negative securities analyst reports issued
during the week prior to September 11.230
While reports of the terrorists' ability to financially profit from
the attacks seem to be exaggerated, it is undisputed that groups
like al Qaeda have vast financial resources that spread like
tentacles throughout the world."3  Bin Laden's personal fortune
Sept. 18, 2001, at A20.
226. See William Drozdiak, Stock Trades Probed for Tie to Bin Laden;
Investigation Focuses on Sales of Shares of Airlines and Insurers Before Attacks,
WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2001, at A8.
227. See id.
228. See Kurt Eichenwald & Edmund L. Andrews, Regulators Find No
Evidence That Advance Knowledge of Attacks Was Used for Profit, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 28, 2001, at B4.
229. Id.
230. See id.
231. See generally Christopher R. Fenton, U.S. Policy Towards Foreign Direct
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has been estimated to be as high as $300 million, and private
donors are believed to contribute several million dollars to his
terrorist network every year.232 This is an impressive sum, but even
more alarming is that bin Laden's wealth "is not the sole or even
the primary source of al Qaeda funds today, according to a variety
of sources, including United States government reports, Pakistani
intelligence sources and the testimony of a former associate." '233
Fund-raising activities of al Qaeda allegedly have run the gamut
from "operating ostrich farms and shrimp boats in Kenya, to
owning forest land in Turkey, to engaging in diamond trading in
Africa and acquiring agricultural holdings in Tajikistan. ,114
It is important to note that, unlike the narcotics trafficking
activities that our nation's money laundering provisions were
originally enacted to combat, much of the funding of al Qaeda and
other terrorist networks is obtained legally. Obviously, this makes
it less likely for such organizations to need to resort to money
laundering, and more important for law enforcement authorities to
have to rely on other laws and means to thwart terrorist activities.
Indeed, it seems entirely possible that the IMLA Act could very
well have more of an impact in stopping drug-related crimes than
terrorism.
Al Qaeda and certain other terrorist networks may be well-
funded, and the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 may
have required unprecedented levels of sophisticated planning, but
it does not appear that vast sums of money were used in planning
or carrying out the recent attacks. Reports indicate that the
terrorists were initially funded with a wire transfer of $100,000 that
Investment Post-September 11: Exon-Florio in the Age of Transnational Security,
41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 195, 228-29 (2002) (discussing various international
efforts to target and seize terrorist funds, and stating that "[b]y the end of
December, 2001, the Department of Treasury had frozen USD $61 million in Al
Queda assets, while approximately one hundred and forty-two nations have
issued orders to block any accounts found to be connected to international
terrorism.").
232. See Robert O'Harrow, Jr. et al., Bin Laden's Money Takes Hidden Paths
to Agents of Terror; Records Hint at Complex Financial Web, WASH. POST, Sept.
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was subsequently supplemented by occasional additional deposits,
usually of $10,000 or less.235 The funds were ultimately dispersed
among roughly nine checking accounts at a Florida bank, and it has
been observed that there was no unusual activity in those accounts
that would have alerted authorities under even the most intense
scrutiny.236 This is hardly surprising, considering that "banks in
Florida hold about $49 billion in non-resident alien deposits.""
It is believed that the hijackers often paid cash for flight
training lessons that cost as much as $2 0,000." This would
certainly raise eyebrows, but given the enormous demands on the
time of the FBI and other federal agencies, it would be hard to
speculate that such transactions would ever amount to more than a
momentary blip on their radar. Still, some have indicated that,
even with the existing policies and procedures, someone should
have noticed that something was awry: Senator Charles E. Grassley
(R-Iowa), ranking minority member of the Senate Finance
Committee, indicated that "law enforcement officials did not take
notice of large cash transactions by hijackers or their associates,
which should have been documented by Suspicious Activity
Reports, or SARs, collected by the IRS.""n9
It is highly questionable whether the money laundering
provisions of the Act would have deterred or prevented the World
Trade Center attack. As discussed above, Section 371 of the Act
provides new bulk cash smuggling rules that prohibit transporting
more than $10,000 into or out of the U.S. in an attempt to evade
235. See Eggen & Day, supra note 160, at Al.
236. See O'Harrow, Jr. et al., supra note 232, at A13. But see infra note 239
and accompanying text (citing a quotation attributed to Senator Charles E.
Grassley of Iowa indicating that Senator Grassley believes there may have been
sufficient suspicious activity in the terrorists' accounts to warrant scrutiny by
government officials). It is debatable whether the increased awareness of
suspicious transactions that has developed since September 11, 2001 will result in
detection of future transactions similar to those made by the hijackers and their
associates. The guidelines for the filing of SARs remain very subjective, although
the onus is certainly now on financial institutions to err on the side of caution. See
supra notes 30, 134-36 and accompanying text.
237. FIRST WATCH, supra note 170, at 2.
238. See Eggen & Day, supra note 160, at Al.
239. See id. at Al.
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currency reporting requirements.2'  Stefan D. Cassella, the
assistant chief of the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering
Section of the U.S. Department of Justice feels that the new bulk
cash smuggling rules are inadequate.' Cassella notes that the
September 11 terrorists "engaged in moving quantities of money
from place to place in the United States, using public
transportation and other facilities of interstate commerce, and
clearly intending that the money be used to commit one of the
greatest criminal acts ever perpetrated on American soil," and he
suggests that "[t]ransporting such a large quantity of cash-on a
highway, in an airport, or on a train or bus-should be an offense
as well, if the courier knows the money is criminal proceeds or that
it is intended to be used for an unlawful purpose., 24 2 Cassella
believes that U.S. money laundering laws in general are too
retrospective in nature; they ask "what was the source of the
laundered money and how has the bad guy tried to hide it?"
instead of "what is the bad guy planning to do with the money that
he is going to such great lengths to conceal it."24'3
CONCLUSION
It is a clich6 to observe that the world became a different place
after September 11, 2001, but many things have changed, and the
International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist
Financing Act of 2001 is part of the new landscape. It will affect
most Americans in some way, and many will undoubtedly be
affected to a profound degree. Only time will tell if the IMLA Act
will accomplish the objectives of its creators, but Congress' failure
to adequately debate the Act's provisions is alarming, and the cost
of the act in terms of increased regulatory burdens and decreased
privacy of Americans is immeasurable. Swift action is needed in
times of crisis, but it does not augur well when a panicked Congress
passes legislation that has been repeatedly rejected over a period
240. See supra text accompanying notes 155-62.
241. Stefan D. Cassella, Money Laundering Has Gone Global: It's Time to
Update the Federal Laws, FED. LAW., Jan. 2002, at 24-31.
242- Id. at 30.
243. Id.
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of many years.'
It is entirely possible that the IMLA Act will have benefits
other than those intended. The Act clearly has the purpose of
targeting and thwarting terrorist activity, but it is likely that the
Act will also provide law enforcement authorities with greater
leverage to deter and prosecute more traditional laundering
activities, such as those conducted by narcotics traffickers. It has
also been suggested that the Act will help the IRS crack down on
tax evasion, a crime commonly associated with money laundering.
"[T]he IRS has been pushing for some of the same disclosure and
information provisions provided in [the IMLA Act] in its pursuit of
U.S. citizens and residents using foreign bank accounts and trusts
to avoid U.S. taxes."2 '5  Moreover, several traditional offshore
banking havens have recently succumbed to pressure by U.S. tax
authorities to be more cooperative in rooting out tax evasion. An
example is the agreement recently reached between the U.S. and
the Cayman Islands that calls for granting access by U.S. tax
authorities to Cayman Island bank accounts starting in 2004.246
Terrorism is fundamentally different from other varieties of
organized crime in the sense that its ultimate objective does not
directly involve the financial enrichment of its perpetrators.
Money laundering has only been a crime since 1986, and since that
time it has primarily been used, with moderate success, to combat
the war on drugs. 7 The new legislation is intended to expand the
1986 Act to allow its provisions to help fight terrorism. There is no
doubt that every American would feel more secure if groups like al
Qaeda were to be stripped of their financial resources; but the
reality is that such groups often derive the vast majority of their
funds through legitimate contributions and businesses, and the
attacks like the one that occurred on September 11, 2001 can be
accomplished with minimal resources. Clearly, law enforcement
will have to rely on other means if it is going to be successful in
thwarting terrorism. Our money laundering laws will continue to
244. See supra notes 4, 5, 179 and accompanying text.
245. Mark A. Luscombe, Tax-Related Provisions in the New Anti-Terrorism
Law, TAXES, Dec. 1, 2001, at 3.
246. See Hardesty, supra note 33.
247. See supra notes 43, 167, 168 and accompanying text.
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be used in the effort to thwart organized crime, but the provisions
of the IMLA Act will have a negligible effect on the war against
terrorism while creating serious headaches for financial institutions
and many Americans.
Notes & Observations
